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TORT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS
TO USERS OF THEIR GOODS*
GEORGE:

T

A.

H.

SEEFELt

THE GENERAL RULE

HE manufacture of articles to meet the need of an increasingly
complex civilization has grown from the work-shop stage to multiple factory size. The manufacturer has sought centralization in management and economically advantageous location, compelling him to
depend upon the wholesaler, jobber, and retailer for distribution, which
dependence has still proved its strength as against a struggling manufacturer-direct-to-consumer movement. On the other hand, the persons
using manufactured goods are not the purchasers of such goods, in
many cases, but the sub-purchasers, or agents, servants, and employees
of the purchasers. With this development of interdependency has come
a corresponding severance of the immediate and direct relation between maker and user.
*The scope of this article is limited to the liability of manufacturers to users
of their goods, and it does not include the liability of lessors or vendors of
defective goods, except incidentally. Particular attention is given to Wisconsin
law.
t Member of the Milwaukee bar.
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Liability of the manufacturer for injuries resulting to users of
defective articles has developed, with the traditional lag, upon theories
created to meet the factual change just outlined. Breach of contractual
duties, including breach of conditions and of warranties, express or
implied, are no longer suitable as the bases for liability of a manufacturer to a user, since such principles are useful only where the relation between user and maker is contractual. In meeting the situation
where the user of a defective article is someone other than the purchaser from the manufacturer, the American courts have generally
concluded that the manufacturer is not liable for injury resulting
from the defect except in certain unusual cases.' This principle
has been developed through a number of different lines of reasoning,
some of which result from a misconception of decided cases and of
negligence rules in general.
One of the cases most frequently cited in support of the general
rule indicated above, is Winterbottom v. Wright.2 This case, however,
is on close analysis unsatisfactory as establishing any principle similar
to that for which it is usually cited. Winterbottom sued the defendant,
Wright, for injuries resulting from the breaking down of a coach which
the defendant had contracted to keep in repair. The declaration alleged
that the defendant had contracted to furnish the Postmaster-General
with a mail coach, and to keep the coach in repair; and that the plaintiff, knowing and relying on such contract, undertook to drive the mail
coach and suffered injury, when the coach broke down, because of the
defendant's failure to perform his duty, in disregard of his contract.
It is apparent that, in view of the strict rules of pleading, extant at the
time, the court properly ruled on demurrer that no duty toward the
plaintiff was alleged, since the action was brought "simply because
the defendant was a contractor with another." 3
The Winterbottom case differs from the situation in which the
manufacturer has made a defective article which is sold indirectly to
the plaintiff. In the latter case, the duty resting on the manufacturer
is properly one owed not only to an immediate contracting party, but
to anyone who might reasonably be injured from failure to perform
such duty. This obligation is essentially one of tort. The defendant in
v. Chippewa Shoe Mfg. Co., 163 Wis. 428, 157 N.W. 1101 (1916);
Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N.W. 157 (1909) ; Huset v.
.LI. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 Fed. 865 (1903); Lynch v. Internat.
Harvester Co. of Amer., 60 F. (2d) 223 (1932); (This case may be explained on the ground that the lapse of five years between the sale of the
machine and the injury was a conclusive contradiction of the claim that the
machine was imminently dangerous to life and limb when sold.) 3 COOLEY on
TORTS, 463. Notes: 17 A.L.R. 672, 39 A.L.R. 992, 63 A.L.R. 340, 2 Wis. L.
REv. 431
2 10 M. & W. 109 (1842).
3Lord Abinger,p.114.
1Kerwin

1941]

TORT LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS

the Winterbottom case, on the other hand, was a lessor on whom no
other duty rested than the duty created by virtue of his contract with
the Postmaster-General. 4 The failure to repair occurred after possession had been transferred to the Postmaster-General, and with the
transfer of possession, all obligation to third parties ceased. If the
defendant had improperly performed repairs, he might have been
liable to the plaintiff in a tort action.5
One of the most frequently cited cases in America is Huset v. J. L
Case Threshing Machine Co.,, a case which has probably been more
influential in crystallizing the principles used in support of decisions
than any other decision up to MacPherson v. Buick Motor Car Co.7
decided in 1916. It has, moreover, shifted the emphasis from a rational
attack to a purely formalistic approach, contrary to ordinary experience.
In the Huset case the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that his
employer had purchased from the defendant a threshing machine
manufactured by it. The cylinder was covered by a wooden platform,
alleged to be defectively constructed by the defendant, and known to
the defendant to be defective. It was the plaintiff's duty to feed the
machine by standing on this platform, and the first day the machine
was used, this covering broke and the plaintiff's leg was severely
injured. The lower court sustained the defendant's demurrer to the
complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit reversed this
decision.
The court, through Sanborn, J., pointed out that generally a manufacturer is not liable to any person other than the purchaser, for
injuries resulting from defects in the goods purchased. The reasons
given for this rule were, first, that injury to a third person other than
the purchaser is not generally the probable result of negligence in
manufacture, because such result cannot be anticipated, and because the
purchase is an intervening cause; and second, that a wise public policy
4 The lessor of land is not liable to a third party for failure to repair condition
arising after the lease is made, in the absence of statute: Atwill v. Blatz, 118
Wis. 226, 95 N.W. 99 (1903). See Kinney v. Luebkeman, 214 Wis. 1, 252 N.W.
282 (1934).
Even if there is a covenant to repair in the lease, there is no liability of
the lessor to third parties, by general rule. Conahan v. Fisher, 233 Mass. 234,
124 N.E. 13 (1919); Silverman v. Isaac, 183 N.Y. App. 542, 170 N.Y.
Supp. 290 (1918); McGinn v. French, 107 Wis. 54, 82 N.W. 724 (1900). But
see Flood v. Pabst Brewing Co., 158 Wis. 626, 149 N.W. 489 (1914); 8 A.L.R.
765, 766.
In case of personal property, the lessee has been held liable in the absence
of concealment of defect, even for a defect existing at time of lease: In re
New York Dock Co., 61 Fed. (2d) 777 (1932).
5 Cf. cases cited by Parke, B. in Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Exch. 761 (1851);
Parry v. Smith, L.R. 4 C.P.D. 325 (1879). Also see following cases involving
real estate: Wertheimer v. Saunders, 95 Wis. 573, 70 N.W. 824 (1897) ; Wilber
v. Follansbee, 97 Wis. 577, 72 N.W. 741 (1897) ; Medley v. Trenton Investment
Co., 205 Wis. 30, 236 N.W. 713 (1931).
6 120 Fed. 865 (C.C.A. 8th, 1903).
7 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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requires that there be a definite limit to the liability of makers of
machines to be used by all kinds of people, far and near.
In considering the first reason, attention should be given again to
the brief survey of present day conditions, as outlined at the beginning of this article. To say that injury to someone other than the purchaser from the maker is not generally the probable result of negligence in manufacture, is to presuppose a factual condition unrelated
to the present. In the ordinary course of events today, the person most
likely to be injured in using a manufactured article is one who has
had no dealings with the manufacturer, and knows nothing whatever
about him other perhaps than his trademark. Furthermore, the maker
of the defective article can and should anticipate that the ultimate
user of his article will be someone other than the retailer or wholesaler
to whom he sells.8
Liability of the manufacturer cannot be cut off by the purchase
since such purchase is not an intervening cause, but rather a link in the
chain of causation. One essential characteristic of an intervening cause
is that it could not have been foreseen by exercise of reasonable diligence. 9 If the defect is latent, any reasonable inspection on the part
of the purchaser would not disclose it and the manufacturer must contemplate that the user will not discover the defect. Even where it might
be discoverable upon close examination, the breach of a duty to examine
by the user should not relieve the maker from liability.'" The wrongful
act of another should not relieve the first wrongdoer from liability,
if the latter would have been liable regardless of the second wrongdoer."
The American courts have generally followed the rule that the
purchase is an intervening cause, and this rule has been effectively
applied in cases where the article purchased is a structure built according to plans, and inspected by the purchaser before acceptance.' 2 In a
8 Schubert v. Clark Co., 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103 (1892).
9

Morey v. Lake Superior T. & T. Co., 125 Wis. 148, 103 N.W. 271 (1905);
Wilczynski v. Milw. Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 171 Wis. 508, 177 N.W. 876 (1920);
Byerly v. Thorpe, 221 Wis. 28, 265 N.W. 76 (1936).
1On Moon v. R. R., 46 Minn. 106, 48 N.W. 679 (1891), the court held that the
admitted negligence of the Manitoba Railroad in not examining a freight car
supplied to it by the defendant railroad, did not relieve the defendant from
liability to a brakeman employed by the Manitoba Railroad. Atkinson v. The
Goodrich Transp. Co., 60 Wis. 141, 18 N.W. 764 (1884).
"1See Pizzo v. Wiemann, 149 Wis. 235, 134 N.W. 899 (1912). But where the act
of a third party changes conditions so as to cause a result which could not
have been contemplated by the manufacturer, and which would not have happened but for such act, the manufacturer is not liable. See Derouso v. Internat. Harvester Co. of Amer., 157 Wis. 32, 145 N.W. 771 (1914); Galst
v. American Ladder Co., 165 Wis. 307, 162 N.W. 319 (1917).
22 Daugherty v. Herzog, 145 Ind. 255, 44 N.E. 457 (1896). See Travis v. Rochester
Bridge Co,, 188 Ind. 79, 122 N.E. 1 (1919) for distinction between contractor
and manufacturer. Congregation v. Smith, 163 Pa. 561, 30 Atl. 279 (1894);
Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. 70, 21 AtI. 244 (1891) ; Losee v. Clute, 51 N.Y. 494
(1873); Marvin Safe Co. v. Ward, 46 N.J. Law 19 (1884).
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case such as Marvin Safe Co. v. Ward, where the plans were furnished
by purchaser, and the contractor was careful in building according to
the plans, he should not be held liable for injury to one using the
structure.
It is apparent that the sounder of the two reasons given by Sanborn,
J., is the second, relating to public policy. 13 He says:
".. . for the reason that a wise and conservative public policy
has impressed the Courts with the view that there must be a
fixed and definite limitation to the liability of manufacturers
and vendors for negligence in the construction and sale of complicated machines and structures, which are to be operated or
used by the intelligent and ignorant, the skillful and the incompetent, the watchful and the careless, parties that cannot be
known to the manufacturers or vendors, and who use the articles all over the country, hundreds of miles distant from the
place of their manufacture or original sale, a general rule has
been adopted .... that the liability of the contractor or manufacturer for negligence in the construction or sale of the articles which he makes or vends, is limited to the persons to whom
he is liable under his contracts of construction or sale."
The public policy argument is used in a very similar manner in the

Winterbottom case, by Lord Abinger, C. B., and Baron Alderson."
With the development of powerful manufacturing interests, even
this paternalistic reasoning has lost much of its force. In 1903, when
the Huset case was decided, it may have been necessary to foster the
growth of manufacturing by arbitrarily limiting the liability of manufacturers to their immediate purchasers. It is undoubtedly unwise to
establish a standard of care requiring perfection in the manufacture
of products, but there is no sound public policy which protects the
manufacturer from liability to one who is injured, when carefully
using goods made dangerous by lack of care in their manufacture, nor
does the distance separating maker and user have any bearing. On the
other hand, a misuse by a negligent or incompetent purchaser and his
agents, is not to be contemplated by the maker, and he is not liable for
injuries arising therefrom.
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE GENERAL RULE
In the Huset case, three exceptions to the general rule were recog5
nized.'
Is P. 867.
" Pp. 114,115.
'5

120 Fed. 865, 870-71. These exceptions are recognized in Wisconsin although
the second one mentioned in the Huset case is not generally included in cases
dealing with the liability of manufacturers. The Wisconsin rule and exceptions
were developed in Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., supra, note 1, and formally
restated in Kerwin v. Chippewa Shoe Mfg. Co., supra, note 1.
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The first is that an act of negligence of the manufacturer or
vendor which is imminently dangerous to the life or health of
mankind, and which is committed in the preparation or sale
of an article intended to preserve, destroy or affect human life,
is actionable by third parties who suffer from the negligence.
The second exception is that an owner's act of negligence which
causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner's premises, may form the basis of
an action against the owner.
The third exception to the rule is that one who sells or delivers
an article which he knows to be imminently dangerous to life or
limb to another, without notice of its qualities, is liable to any
person who suffers an injury therefrom, which might have been
anticipated, whether there were any contractual relations between the parties or not.
Liability of a druggist or apothecary was recognized as early as
1852 in the United States, 16 and it was held that his duty arose out
of the nature of his business and the likelihood of injury to anyone
using drugs improperly prepared, compounded, labelled, or prescribed.
One who prepares and sells food, drugs, and explosives, is engaging
in activity which is very likely to cause harm if mismanaged even
slightly. Furthermore, the improper preparation of a food, or compounding of a drug usually cannot be discovered by ordinary examination by the prospective user. Thus, by general principles of negligence, there is a duty toward all persons not to fail under such circumstances that a reasonably prudent man might anticipate injury as a
natural and ordinary consequence of such failure.'" In Haley v. Swift
& Co."' the court permitted recovery from a defendant who was alleged
to have negligently supplied a dealer with "adulterated link sausage
which contained diseased, infected, putrid, decomposed, and poisonous animal matter." The plaintiff, a minor, ate some of the sausage and
became permanently injured. The court rested its decision primarily
on the Hasbrouck case, and in discussing that case said:
The basis of the decision [referring to the Hasbrouck decision]
recognizes the distinction between acts which are imminently
dangerous in their effects upon human life, limbs, and health,
and those that are not. In the former class of cases, if the acts
were wilfully or negligently committed, the guilty party is legally
liable to the injured persons, regardless of any contractual relation existing between them, while in the latter class of cases
with whom he has contracted
there is liability only to persons
19
or to whom he owes a duty.
16 Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
17 See Timlin, J. in Hasbrouck v. Armour & Co., supra, note 1, at p. 363 of the

court's decision.

152 Wis. 570, 140 N.W. 292 (1913).
19 P. 572 (Wis. Rep.).
18
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In the Huset case and in Kerwin v. Chippewa Shoe Manufacturing
Company a separate exception was made of cases involving articles
intended to preserve, affect, or destroy human life. Timlin, J., in the
Hasbrouck case really did not separately classify cases under the above

heading, but gave such cases as illustrations of the general exception
that a manufacturer of articles
"which by reason of negligent construction he knows to be imminently dangerous to life or limb, or is manifestly and apparently
dangerous when used as it is intended to be used, is liable to any
which injury might
person who suffers an injury therefrom,
20
have been reasonably anticipated.1

This approach was recognized in the Haley case and is much more
commendable than the approach of formalistic classification. Foods,
drugs, explosives, and similar goods are not in and of themselves more
dangerous than a machine or a ladder, for instance. But when negligently made or prepared, they become dangerous. A defective boiler
is just as likely to injure a user as a mislabelled poison.2 '
The Haley decision might have been rested upon the adulterated
of cases which find
food statute, and it would then fall into that group
22
the duty of the manufacturer in statutory law.
The third exception made by Sanborn, J., in the Huset case is the
most important since the majority of cases fall into this group. This
exception is also the first or general exception stated by Timlin, J., in
the Hasbrouck case. Because of its wide scope, it has served to cover
a great variety of cases, and through the interpretative skill of jurists,
it has been considerably extended.
The exception stated in the Hasbrouck case first qualifies the article as one "which invites a certain use."2' 3 One of the earliest Wisconsin
cases of this kind was Bright v. The Barnett & Record Co.24 In that
case the parents of a deceased employee sued the defendant for negligence in furnishing a defective plank in the scaffold built under an
agreement with the deceased's employer for the use of the deceased and
other employes. The deceased was fatally injured when the defective
20 P. 365 (Wis. Rep.).
21 Thus the Wisconsin legislature has seen fit to require safety devices for corn-

husking and shredding machines. See § 167.12, Wis. STAT. 1925 (applied in the
Derouso case, supra, note 11, and wood-sawing machines, see § 167.16, Wis.
STATS. 1925 (applied in Edler v. Algoma Foundry & Machine Co., 200 Wis. 471,
227 N.W. 944 [1930]). If the distinction between defective machines and mislabelled poisons rests upon the fact that the sale of the latter is an indictable
offense, by common law and by statute as pointed out by Hunt, J. in Loop v.
Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870), then there is no longer much of a distinction,
in view of the numerous and varied statutes punishing sale of unsafe
machinery.
22
Mossrud v. Lee, 163 Wis. 229, 157 N.W. 758 (1916). This case involved a
direct sale from a druggist to a user. See also cases in note 21, supra.
23P . 365 (Wis. Rep.).
24 88 Wis. 299, 60 N.W. 418 (1894).
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plank broke while he was walking on it. The court held that the case
belonged to that class of cases that could be sustained on general
principles outside the rule limiting recovery from a manufacturer to
those with whom the latter has contracted. The two grounds of recovery were: (1) invitation, (2) duty to avoid imminently dangerous
acts. This theory of implied invitation was not a discovery of the
25
Wisconsin Supreme Court, since it was used in Heaven v. Pender,
27
Coughtry v. Globe W. Co.," and Mulchay v. Congregation.
All of
these cases, however, involved a situation where the defendant owned
the premises on which the injury occurred, and through misfeasance
created the dangerous condition. The doctrine of implied invitation
is apparently more appropriate to that group of cases which holds that
a landowner or occupier of land is liable to one who enters his premises
by implied or express invitation, for failure to keep the premises in a
reasonably safe condition.2 8
In the Bright case the defendant company was the principal contractor for the erection of the building on which the staging was to
be used. As such principal contractor, it was in control of the premises,
and thus in a position analogous to the owner. But if the doctrine of
implied invitation is carried that far, it has become almost synonymous
with the second ground set forth by Chief Justice Orton in the Bright
case. He said:
"This liability to third parties is held to exist when the defect is
such as to render the construction in itself imminently dangerous, and serious injury to any person
using it is a natural and
'29
probable consequence of its use.
It will be noted that this principle is similar to the third exception
stated in the Huset case, 0 and to the general exception set out in the
Hasbrouck opinion.' 1 Both of these statements, however, included
knowledge of the danger on the part of the maker, and absence of
notice of the defect to the injured party, and the question arises whether
or not such knowledge and concealment are facts to be proven before
recovery can be allowed.
In all of the cases cited by the court in the Huset case, in support of
the third exception, there were both knowledge of and concealment of
25
26

L.R. 11 Q.B. Div. 503 (1883).
56 N.Y. 124 (1874).

27 125

Mass. 487 (1878).

Gorr v. Mittlestaedt, 96 Wis. 296, 71 N.W. 656 (1897) ; Lehman v. Amsterdam
Coffee Co., 146 Wis. 213, 131 N.W. 362 (1911); Zetley v. Jame Realty Co.,
185 Wis. 205, 201 N.W. 252 (1924); Schroeder v. Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co., 220 Wis. 642, 265 N.W. 559 (1936).
29 P. 307 of the Court's opinion.
3oP. 178.
28

31 P. 364-5 (Wis. Rep.).
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the defect. Thus in Langridge v. Levy 3 2 a dealer sold a gun to a father
for the use of his son, and represented that the gun was safe, and
made by a certain man. It was not safe, and was not made by the man
indicated, and when the son discharged it, it exploded and injured him.
In Wellington v. Oil Co. 33 the defendants, who were wholesale dealers,
knowingly sold to a retail dealer, to be sold by him to his customers
as oil, a dangerous and explosive fluid. The plaintiff used the oil for
illuminating purposes and it exploded and injured him. In Lewis v.
Terry34 a dealer, knowing that a folding bed was defective and unsafe,
sold it to A without informing him of the danger. A's wife suffered a
broken arm and other serious injuries when the bed folded up.
In many states, the necessity of knowledge and concealment has
been referred to time and again.3 5 Illustrative of this view is the opinion in tOlds Motor Works v. Shaffer.36 That case involved a manufacturer of an automobile who represented that the seats in a certain
car were secure when, in fact, they were defectively constructed. The
court said that though the defect was not physically concealed, the
maker was still chargeable with liability, where he was guilty of representing to the purchaser that the machine was safe and sound. If the
purchaser of the machine knows that it is unsafe or dangerous, a third
party who is injured thereby cannot maintain an action in tort against
the maker. The court said on this point:
"The reason for this is that the action against the maker proceeds
on the theory, and is founded on the fact, that in selling the
article he practiced fraud and deceit in concealing the defects that
made its use unsafe and dangerous; and, of course, when it is
admitted or proven that he has not practiced any concealment,
and that the purchaser was well informed as to the defects, the
bottom drops out of the case against the maker, and the liability
is shifted to other shoulders. Another reason is that the maker's
wrongful act in such a case is not the proximate cause of the injury, when it is shown that there was intervention of a new
of the danger
agent, to-wit, the purchaser, who with knowledge
13 7
used and permitted others to use the article.
Thus it has generally been held that where the manufacturer has
informed the purchaser of the defects, he is no longer liable, since he
32 2 M. & W.

519 (1837); 4 M. & W. 337 (1838).

33 Wellington v. Downer Kerosene Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64, 67 (1870).

34 111 Cal. 39,43 Pac. 398 (1896).
35 See charge to the jury in Pierce v. C. H. Bidwell Thresher Co., 153 Mich.
323, 116 N.W. 1104 (1908) ; Laudeman v. Russell & Co., 46 Ind. App. 32, 91
N.E. 822 (1910) ; Herman Krahn v. J. L. Owens Co., 125 Minn. 33, 145 N.W.
626 (1914) ; Miller v. Mead-Morrison Co., 166 Wis. 536, 166 N.W. 315 (1918).
But see Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N.W. 855 (1928).
36 145 Ky. 616, 140 S.W. 1047 (1911).
37 P. 1052 (S.W. Rep.).
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has discharged his duty. 33 There is obviously no quarrel with the
salutary principle relieving the manufacturer from liability if he shows
all defects to the purchaser, and does not attempt to conceal them from
him. However, there is much to be said against a rule which limits
liability to cases in which the manufacturer knew of the defect and
failed to disclose it. If a man carelessly puts together an article which
he does not know to be defective, but which is in fact defective, and
injury results to the user by reason of the defect, he should not be
relieved from liability just because he did not actually know of such
defect. If the maker of an article is negligent, and that means if he
acts in such a manner that he should know that some injury probably
will result to a certain class of persons, he should be liable for injuries
resulting proximately from such negligence.3 9
C. THE PRESENT TREND
The recent tendency of many courts has been to attack the problem
from that point of view, and some courts, notably the Court of Appeals
of New York and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, have almost
always proceeded upon general principles of negligence as applied to
a particular set of facts.4 0 The sporadic attempt of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to classify in the Hasbrouck, Haley, and Kerwin cases,
was probably due to the influence of the Huset case, decided a few years
prior to the Hasbrouck case.
38 Loop v. Litchfield, 42 N.Y. 351 (1870). Similarly where the purchaser pro-

vided the plans or inspected the finished article, the manufacturer is not liable
according to some authorities. See Marvin Safe Co. case, supra, note 12.
3
9 Thus negligence was defined in Johanson v. Webster Mfg. Co., 139 Wis. 181,
120 N.W. 832 (1909): "Negligence in law is not mere carelessness, but is
careless conduct under such circumstances that an ordinary prudent person
would anticipate some injury to another as a reasonably probable result thereof." (p. 184).
4o The most important New York cases, in addition to those already cited, are
as follows: Torgesen v. Schult, 192 N.Y. 156, 84 N.E. 956 (1908) (Vendor of
syphon bottles, filled under excessive pressure); Statler v. George A. Ray
Mfg. Co., 195 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909) (Defective coffee urn) ; Rosebrock
v. General Electric Co., 236 N.Y. 227, 140 N.E. 571 (1923) (Defectively packed
transformer); McGlone v. William Angus, Inc., 248 N.Y. 197, 161 N.E. 469
(1928) (Defective scaffold); Pine Grove Poultry Farm, Inc. v. Newton ByProducts Mfg. Co., Inc., 248 N.Y. 293, 162 N.E. 84 (1928) (Deleterious meat
scrap poultry feed, prohibited by statute); Genesee County Patrons F. R.
Ass'n. v. Sonneborn Sons, 263 N.Y. 463, 189 N.E. 551 (1934) (Explosive
water proofing preparation); Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 273 N.Y.
485, 6 N.E. (2d) 415 (1936) (Defective coffee urn). The most important Wisconsin cases, in addition to those already cited, are as follows:
a. Defendant held liable. Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., 182 Wis. 94,
195 N.W. 388 (1923).
b. Defendant held not liable: Zieman v. The Kieckhefer Elevator Mfg. Co.,
90 Wis. 497, 63 N.W. 1021 (1895) ; Beznor v. Howell, 203 Wis. 1, 233 N.W.
758 (1930); Spille v. Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co., 105 Wis. 340, 81 N.W.
397 (1900) (Lower court entered judgment for plaintiff on special verdict.
Supreme Court remanded case for new trial) ; Marsh Wood Products Co.
v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W. 392 (1932) (Lower court
entered judgment for plaintiffs; Supreme Court remanded case for new
trial).
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In New York, the principles partially formulated in Thomas v.
Winchester4 ' were developed in Devlin v. Smith.42 In the Devlin case
the plaintiff's employer contracted to paint the dome of the county
court-house. He also contracted with the defendant Stevenson for the
erection of a scaffold by the latter. Stevenson built a defective scaffold
and the plaintiff's intestate was killed as a result of the defect. The
court held that the defendant Stevenson was liable, since he undertook
to build a scaffold for the express purpose of enabling the workmen of
the principal contractor to stand upon it. Any defect would be likely
to result in injury, and the careless construction of the scaffold was
an imminently dangerous act.
Though the reasoning in the Devlin case hints at the doctrine of
implied invitation, used by some jurists in the cases heretofore discused, the New York court was astute enough to place little emphasis
upon this ground because of the factual difference between the cases
to which it properly applies and the Devlin case. 43 The defendant in
the latter case had no ownership, possession, or control of the real
estate upon which the defective 'scaffolding was built. Liability was
rested partly upon the argument that the defendant knew that the
plaintiff and his co-employees would use the scaffold, and thus were in
the group to which injury would reasonably and probably result, if
there were defects in construction. The court also met the argument
that the purchase is an intervening cause, by pointing out that where
the purchaser is entitled to rely upon the judgment and skill of the
maker, any failure on his part to examine cannot be treated as an
intervening cause.
These principles of the Devlin case reached fruition in MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., and the admirable opinion of Cardozo in that case
will be of increasing influence. 44 A similar development in Wisconsin
has culminated in Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co.4 5 in which case,
the defendant, Fox Bros. Buick Co., was held liable for carelessly
selling a rebuilt used car provided with inadequate brakes. As a result
of the defective brakes the purchaser of the car ran into the plaintiff
and injured her. The court preferred to rest the liability of the defend41
4

2 Supra, note 16.

43

89 N.Y. 470 (1882).
Cardozo, J. in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra note 7, at p. 393, states
that the underlying principle of the Devlin case is the invitation by the defendant to the plaintiff to use the defective appliance. It is submitted that the
principle might better have been phrased by Cardozo in terms of the class of
persons to whom injury was the probable result of defective work. This would
be in closer accord with the reasoning in the opinion in the Devlin case.

the MacPherson case involved liability of the Buick Motor Co. for
negligently incorporating a defective wheel into one of its cars without inspection, the doctrine of that case has now been extended to the manufacturer
of the defective part incorporated into the finished article: Smith v. Peerless
Glass Co., Inc., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N.E. 576 (1932).
5 Supra, note 35.

44Though
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ant upon the principles relating to liability of vendors of defective
articles because of certain evidence showing efficient brakes immediately
after rebuilding. But the court expressly states that the principles
governing a vendor's liability are exactly the same as those governing
the case of a manufacturer of a new automobile. 6
The Flies case fairly states the attitude of the Wisconsin court
on a number of questions just considered. First, the negligence of the
purchaser in failing to examine the car after purchasing it was not an
intervening cause. The court said :4
"In this case the jury found that at the time of the sale Fox
Brothers represented to Johnson that the car was equipped with
all standard equipments and in proper operating condition for
use upon the streets of La Crosse. This representation must have
been made by Fox Brothers with the intention of having Johnson rely upon it, in which event they must have anticipated that
he would make no inspection concerning the efficiency of the
brakes. Their own representations having induced or contributed
to Johnson's failure to make the inspection, they cannot claim
immunity from the consequences of their own negligence because of Johnson's failure to make an inspection relying upon
their representations. Even though Johnson's failure to inspect
constituted negligence available to the plaintiff, it did not constitute an intervening cause as to Fox Brothers."
Secondly, actual knowledge of the defect on the part of the manufacturer or maker is unnecessary. It is sufficient if a reasonably prudent person exercising ordinary care under the circumstances would
have known of the defect."
Thirdly, "an automobile lacking the equipment necessary to keep
it under the control of the driver is also a dangerous instrumentality,
not only to the people on the street, but to people who may be in the
49
car."
In discussing what articles are "imminently dangerous," the court
incidentally throws light upon the meaning of that familiar phrase. The
long course of usage has indicated that the phrasing is a short cut
for 'very likely to cause harm in the usual course of events'.
It is interesting to note that in the Flies case the Devlin and Schubert
cases are pointed out as the forerunners of a growing mass of cases in
this country. When the Huset case was decided, these two cases were
mentioned in the opinion of that case as standing alone as far as the
principles formulated in the Huset case were concerned. Fortunately,
the view taken by these two cases and others like them has been
46

p. 209-10 (Wis. Rep.).

4

P. 201 (Wis. Rep.).

49

P. 207 (Wis. Rep.).

4Sp. 209 (Wis. Rep.).
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repeatedly recognized, and there is every indication that continued
reliance will be placed upon them.
D. PROBLEMS OF PLEADING AND PROOF
To the practicing attorney, the successful building of a case includes a preparatory consideration of how a theoretically meritorious
claim can be proved. A good case in the office may fail in court for
lack of proper pleading and proof, and some attention is now given to
a few of the rules of pleading and evidence which become important
in cases involving the liability of manufacturers.
The liberalization of code pleading in the code states has not yet
eliminated the necessity of stating facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action, and it is elementary that the complainant must allege facts
which will satisfy the rules of substantive law applicable to his case.
In cases of the kind under discussion, it will be necessary in most
states to allege facts showing: (1) Careless manufacture or assembly
of product intended to preserve, destroy, or affect human life; or
(la) Careless manufacture or assembly of a product which is so
defective as to be dangerous to life and limb ;5o (2) That the defendant
knew of the defect when it sold the article, or at least ought to have
known of it; (3) That the defect was the proximate cause of the
injury; (4) That the article was intended for the purpose for which
it was being used; (5) That plaintiff was one of the class of persons
by whom it was contemplated the article would be used; (6) Damages.
In cases where the article sold is so defective as to be dangerous to
life and limb, but is not one intended to preserve, destroy, or affect
human life, an additional allegation to those mentioned above must be
included, namely (7) That the defect was concealed to such an extent
that ordinary observation on the part of the plaintiff would not discover it.51 The last allegation is one of the most necessary in many
jurisdictions, in cases that do not involve the so-called inherently
dangerous articles. There is much to be said for the argument that
no manufacturer should be held liable for an injury resulting from a
danger about which he warned the buyer, even though user was not
informed, or which was so apparent as to make it unlikely that anyone
would fail to notice it. Under such circumstances, the manufacturer is
not liable for negligence, since his duty under most current theories is
satisfied. The real question is, how far shall the duty be extended?
In cases where the maker sells to a retailer or middleman, a warning
50 In states which follow the Huset case, there is a third possible allegation to
51 correspond with the second exception as quoted, supra.
For a clear statement of conditions necessary to recover in cases of articles
not classed as inherently dangerous (explosives, drugs, etc.) see Krahn v.
J. L. Owens Co., 125 Minn. 33, 145 N.W. 626 (1914) and charge to the jury
in Pierce v. C. H. Bidwell Thresher Co., 153 Mich. 323, 116 N.W. 1104 (1908).
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about the dangers in the use of the article is a mere gesture, and a very
ineffective protection to the user. In such a situation, the duty of the
maker should be extended to requiring warning which will reach the
user. On the other hand, where the dangers are obvious to the ordinary
person, the manufacturer should not be required to pay damages for
injury to the ignorant or incompetent user. Such a risk is properly one
for an insurance company.
A complaint which is formed with allegations like those previously
mentioned, is one framed on negligence theories. The question has often
arisen whether or not an action could be based upon an implied warranty in cases where the plaintiff is not the purchaser from the manufacturer. Though there is a great conflict of authority on this question 52 the majority rule is against the application of implied warranty
in cases of this kind.
The theory of warranty is an outgrowth of the ancient principles of
deceit5 3 and developed as a part of the law of contracts, and particularly
of sales, although it originated prior to the action of assumpsit. It has
been so closely associated with contractual rights, and the buyer-seller
relationship, that its applicability to situations involving a subpurchaser
or remote user, is not clearly recognized. 54
Those courts which apply it often do so without giving any further
reason than that privity is not controlling.55 On the basis of origin, this
may be a sound argument, but in view of the development of the doctrine of implied warranty, it is contrary to the prevalent juristic reasoning. Furthermore, it will be noted that in many of the cases in which
implied warranty was approved, the defendant was a dealer who sold
to the plaintiff or some member of his family; that the article involved
was a food or beverage, and in most cases it was sold in a sealed container or bottle, bearing some sort of label. Under such circumstances,
it is easier to believe that the manufacturer in effect promised the user
that the product so sold was ready for human consumption, without
examination. A high degree of care is and should be placed upon the
manufacturer who undertakes to provide food for the public.
On the other hand, the large majority of manufacturers who put
ordinary articles other than food, beverage, explosives, etc., on the
52 See notes 17 A.L.R. 672, at 709; 39 A.L.R. 992, at 1000; 63 A.L.R. 340, at
349; 88 A.L.R. 527 at 534.
53 4 WILLsToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) 970.
54 4 WMLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) 998.
Under the UNIFORM SALES ACT, Wisconsin does not recognize implied
representation except in cases of sales between plaintiff and defendant. Prinsen
v. Russos, 194 Wis. 142, 215 N.W. 905 (1927). See also Chysky v. Drake
Brothers Company, Inc. 235 N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923), construing N. Y.
55

PEns.

PROP. LAW.

Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Ia. 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920), and cases

therein cited.
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market, not wrapped in sealed packages, are not held to as high a degree
of care, and certainly make no implied promises to the world at large
about the quality of their products. Their liability is sufficiently broad
if limited to negligence or misrepresentation.
In order to escape the difficulties indicated above, some courts have
permitted the subpurchaser to recover from the retailer on the basis
of warranty, and the retailer in turn to recover from the manufacturer
on a like basis.56 A few courts have even gone as far as permitting
recovery by the retailer from the manufacturer, before the subpurchaser
gets judgment against the retailer.5 7 The limitations of these principles
are obvious; the resulting multiplicity of suits alone strikes the death
knell in these days of expedition.
Considering briefly the misrepresentation theory mentioned above it
will be noted in the suggested allegations previously set out5 s that the
one numbered 7 contains an element of deceit. Realizing the sensible
desire for relief but being hesitant about the applicability of rules of
implied warranty, some courts have developed the idea behind requirement number 7, supra, into a principle of liability on the basis of misrepresentation, express or implied.5 9 Thus in Kuelling v. Roderick
Lean Manufacturing Co.60 it was held that the manufacturer of a road
roller, who wilfully and fraudulently used defective materials concealed
by putty and paint, was liable for injuries caused thereby to one who
put it to its intended use, even though the injured party had no privity
of contract with the manufacturer. The court held that there was not
only fraudulent deceit and concealment, but also what amounted to an
affirmative representation that the roller was sound. The concealment
of the defects so that no weakness could be detected was a misrepresentation that the roller was in a perfectly marketable condition.
The theory of misrepresentation, like all theories, has its limitations,
one of which is the unlikelihood that it would be extended to cases
where the defendant should have known but did not actually know
of the dangerous defect. If the facts of the case permit its use at all,
it is a better approach than the principles of implied warranty in the
type of cases considered herein. Neither, however, is a very satisfactory substitute for negligence doctrines. Both lines of reasoning
were very likely developed because of difficulties in many actions of
proving negligence on the part of the defendant, and we now con56

Bagley v. Cleveland Rolling Mill Co., 21 Fed. 159 (1884) ; Carleton v. Lombard
Ayres & Co., 46 N.Y. Supp 120 (1897); Buckbee v. P. Hohenadel Jr. Co., 224
Fed. 14 (1915); Wolstenholme v. Jos. Randall & Bro. 295 Pa. 131, 144 Atl.
909 (1929). See Hubbard Steel Foundry Co. v. Fed. Bridge & Structural Co.,
169 Wis. 277, 171 N.W. 949 (1919).
57 See Passinger v. Thorburn, 34 N.Y. *634, *639 (1866).
-5 P. 185.
59 See notes in A.L.R. supra,note 52.
60 183 N.Y. 78, 75 N._ME
1098 (1905).
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sider a few of the problems of proof of negligence raised by rules of
evidence in the trial of this type of case.
In all cases the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of nonpersuasion of the jury is on the plaintiff, and if he is to win, he must
produce enough facts to prove the defendant negligent. Because of the
complete separation of user and manufacturer in most situations, both
in distance and business relationship, this burden is of crushing force.
Were it not for certain presumptions, the plaintiff would often lose
where he might win if he had the means of proving the facts.
For almost 75 years, res ipsa loquitur has been recognized in England as an equitable rule of evidence, founded on reason and perhaps
expediency. In the United States it has spread rapidly, and has been
applied frequently in cases where the injury arises from some condition or event that is in its very nature so obviously destructive of the
safety of person or property as to permit of no inference save that of
61
negligence on the part of the person in control of the injurious agency.
In cases involving liability of manufacturers, the courts have usually
applied the doctrine with difficulty. Jurists have in general found it
easier to apply this principle in cases where food, drugs, explosives,
and the other so-called inherently dangerous articles have caused harm.
Though there is a conflict of authority, an increasing number of recent
cases are applying this rule.62 With the passage of statutes in many
states regulating the preparation and sale of foods and drugs, as well
as firearms and explosives, the presumption of negligence arising from
the violation of such statutes is often applied.6
In cases other than those involving food, drugs, and the so-called
inherently dangerous articles, the courts generally have experienced
more difficulty in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, though the
61 Goldman & Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 Atl. 866 (1922) ;
New England Term. Co. v. Grover Tank & Manufacturing Corp., 18 Fed.
Supp. 561 (1937) ; 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (1923 ed.) § 2509.
In general it arises from mere proof of the accident. See Rost v. Roberts,
180 Wis. 207, 192 N.W. 38 (1923), but does not shift the burden of proof in
the sense of non-persuasion of the jury from the plaintiff, see Maryland
Cas. Co. v. Thomas Furnace Co., 185 Wis. 98, 201 N.W. 263 (1924), though
it does throw the burden of going forward with the evidence on the defendant,
Dehmel v. Smith, 200 Wis. 292, 227 N.W. 274 (1930). It cannot be applied when
there is reliance on proving specific acts of negligence alleged in the petition.
Kuhlman v. Water, Light, & Transit Co., 307 Mo. 607, 271 S.W. 788 (1925) ;
Jones v. Southern Kraft Corp. (La. App.) 160 So. 147 (1935). But see
Mintzer v. Wilson (Cal. App.) 68 P. (2d) 370 (1937) on the effect of allegations of specific acts of negligence.
62 See notes on presumption of negligence from foreign substances in food: 4
A.L.R. 1559, 47 A.L.R. 148, 49 A.L.R. 592. See presumption of negligence in
notes on liability of druggists for injury resulting from mistake: 31 A.L.R.
1336, 44 A.L.R. 1482. See note on liability for bursting of container: 4 A.L.R.
1094. See note on explosions of boilers: 23 A.L.R. 484, and gases or chemicals,
8 A.L.R. 500, 39 A.L.R. 1006, and 56 A.L.R. 593.
63 See A.L.R. notes, supra, note 52.
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growing tendency is toward acceptance of it.6 4 One of the chief difficulties is the lack of control by the defendant of the defective article
at the time of the injury in practically every case. It will be noted that
this doctrine originally, and quite consistently throughout its growth,
included control by the defendant,65 for the reason that the defendant
is more apt to b6 very familiar with the condition of things under his
immediate supervision than the plaintiff would be. Furthermore, if control is not present, there is less reason for presuming that the defendant
is better able to explain the causes for the injury than the plaintiff.
A few courts have escaped this requirement of control by construing it
to mean control at the time of the injury,e 6 or by eliminating it
7
altogether.6
In the last analysis, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely an
effort to place the burden of producing evidence of certain facts on the
party most likely to know them. In most cases, the injured party is less
able to prove the presence of a dangerous defect in the article made
by the defendant as the proximate cause of the injury, than the manufacturer is to prove that he took every precaution, and put a carefully
made product on the market. Application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur to manufacturer-user cases is beneficial in that it protects
the public by permitting recovery unless the manufacturer shows he
has used the necessary means to put only carefully made products
on the market.
The element of control at the time of the injury is really important
in this connection only as a precaution against change in the condition
of the article between the time it leaves the manufacturer's hands and
reaches those of the user. In the case of goods sold in the original
wrapper or container,68 the possibility of such change by an intervening cause is negligible, and in the case of most other manufactured
Cyc. p. 594, and cases cited in notes therein. Compare 45 C.J. (1203 & notes).
There is a square conflict of authority in numerous cases involving the explosion of carbonated beverage containers: The res ipsa loquitor doctrine was applied in Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, 55 Ga. A. Rep. 573, 190 S.E. 879
(1937); Taylor v. Berner, 106 N.J.L. 469, 150 Atl. 371 (1930); Stolle v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1925). It was not applied
in Winfree v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 19 Tenn. App. 144, 83 S.W. (2d)
903 (1935); Frank Fehr Brewing Co. v. Corley, 265 Ky. 308, 96 S.W. (2d)
860 (1936); Wheeler v. Laurel Bottling Works, 111 Miss. 442, 71 So. 743
(1916) ; In Spille v. Wisconsin Bridge & Iron Co., 105 Wis. 340, 81 N.W. 397

6429

(1900) res ipsa loquitor was held inapplicable.
65 Illustrative recent cases requiring control by defendant: Ashton v. C. & N. W.
Ry. Co., 198 Wis. 618, 225 N.W. 328 (1929) ; New Eng. Term. Co. v. Grover
Tank & Mfg. Co., 18 F. Supp. 561 (1937); Winfree v. Coca-Cola Bottling
Works, supra, note 64.
66 Goldman & Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindel, supra note 61.
67 Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Crane, supra note 64.
68Thus Block v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 296 N.Y. Supp. 920 (1937) held
that inference of negligence arises when steel blade is found in cigarette taken
from unbroken original container.
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products, it is substantially improbable. Even in the few cases where
the possibility is large, the manufacturer is not unduly burdened by
application of res ipsa loquitur, since he overcomes the presumption
69
of negligence by proof of careful manufacture.
In other words, there is a balancing of the general presumption of
due care against this special presumption of negligence; the defendant
is presumed to be careful unless the facts shown by plaintiff indicate a
grave likelihood that defendant was negligent. Where a user is injured by an extraordinary condition, or activity, of a manufactured
product, and there is nothing to indicate external cause, common sense
points toward some failure on the part of the manufacturer during
the process of manufacture, and he should be required to show that he
took adequate steps to prevent dangerously defective goods from going
on the market. 0
Assuming that the plaintiff has proven sufficient facts to take the
case to the jury, it becomes important for the defendant to prove due
care. It will be remembered that the plaintiff must under all circumstances prove the defendant liable by a preponderance of the evidence,
and bears this burden of non-persuasion of the jury throughout the
case. 7' The defendant, on the other hand, must prove facts to overcome
any presumption of negligence which may be applicable, and to refute
evidence tending toward lack of care. Without extensively discussing
all the ways and means of overcoming evidence of negligence, a few
points may be considered here.
It has been held that if the defendant knew of previous explosions
of heavily charged bottles, this is evidence of negligence in later
explosions. 72 However, the defendant may testify that the only other
which his product exploded, were times when
times that he knew of in
73
the user was negligent.
The custom and practice of manufacturers in production methods
are important on the question of due care. Proof of inspection to the
69 Thus in case of injury to employee, proof that machine is free from discov-

erable defects overcomes presumption of negligence arising from unexplained
accident. Vorbrich v. Geuder & Paeschke Mfg. Co., 96 Wis. 277, 71 N.W. 434
(1897). Also, proof that machine worked perfectly before and after accident
casts burden back onto plaintiff to show its alleged defective action was
caused by defect in machine. Chybowski v. Bucyrus Co., 127 Wis. 332, 106 N.W.
833 (1906). Whether the tests made by manufacturer were suitable and
actually made are jury questions. Holzman v. Harkavy Beverage Co., 293
N.Y.S. 832 (1937).
70 Distinguish this situation from one like that of public carrier in Stimson v.
The Milw. Lake Shore & Western Ry. Co., 75 Wis. 381, 44 N.W. 748 (1890),
or Ashton v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., supra, note 65, in which the likelihood
of an intervening cause is very large, so that the necessity of control is
reasonable.
7' See note 61, supra.
72 Colvar v. Little Rock Bottling Works, 114 Ark. 140, 169 S.W. 810 (1914).
7 Evans v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 49 Ga. A. Rep. 744, 176 S.E. 843 (1934).
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extent customarily followed by the manufacturers in a particular field
is not conclusive, but is good evidence to be considered by the jury on
the issue of due care. 74 However, the fact that other manufacturers
have used similar petcocks and gauges for instance, is not admissible to
7
show defendant was not negligent in using such devices on his product.

5

The present tendency of rules of pleading and evidence seems to
be toward increasing the burden on the defendant manufacturer. With
increase in varieties of mechanical articles, having possibilities of danger not obvious to the unwary user, and the almost complete absence
of physical and contractual relationship between makers and users of
such articles, the stress must be shifted from proof of fault by plaintiff to proof of care by defendant if the injured user is to have adequate
protection.

74 Marsh Wood Products Co. v. Baccock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wis. 209, 240 N.W.

392 (1932) ; Cadillac Motor Co. v. Johnson, 221 Fed. 801 (1915).
75 Nat. Pressure Cooker Co. v. Stroeter, 50 F. (2d) 642 (1931).

